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Self-Actualization and the Need to Create as a Limit on Copyright 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
ABSTRACT 
 Personhood theory is almost invariably cited as one of the primary 
theoretical bases for copyright.  The conventional wisdom views creative works 
as the embodiment of their creator’s personality.  This unique connection between 
authors and their works justifies giving authors property interests in the results of 
their creative efforts.   
 This Chapter argues that the conventional wisdom is too limited.  It offers 
too narrow a vision of the ways that creativity can develop personality by 
focusing exclusively on the results of the creative process and ignoring the self-
actualizing benefits of the creative process itself.  German aesthetic theory 
broadens the understanding of the interactions between creativity and personality.  
Psychologists, aestheticians, and philosophers have underscored how originating 
creative works can play an important role in self-actualization.  When combined 
with the insight creative works frequently borrow from the corpus of existing 
works, this insight provides a basis for this insight provides a basis for broadening 
fair use rights.  Moreover, to the extent that works must be shared with audiences 
or a community of like-minded people in order to be meaningful, it arguably 
supports a right of dissemination.   
 The result is a theory that values the creative process for the process itself 
and not just for the artifacts it creates, takes the interests of follow-on authors 
seriously, and provides an affirmative theory of the public domain.  The internal 
logic of this approach carries with it a number of limitations, specifically that any 
access rights be limited to uses that are noncommercial and educational and 
extend no farther than the amount needed to promote self-actualization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Personhood theory figures prominently in virtually every list of justifications for 
intellectual property in general1 and copyright in particular.2  Typically ascribed to the 
philosophical ideas of Georg William Friedrich Hegel and Immanuel Kant, this theory posits that 
authors have such deep connections with their creations that respect for their sense of self 
requires giving them a degree of ongoing control over those works.3  In essence, works are 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE:  2018, at 7–12 (2018); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 289–91 (1970); William Fisher, 
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 171–72, 
189–92 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in 2 A COMPANION TO 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 653, 660 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).   
2 See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1542 (“[W]orks of art 
are created through a person’s mental labor, and thus embody more of her individual essence of being than works 
created through routine physical labor.  Since artistic works are part of an artist’s very identity, she never should be 
completely separated from the work.”). 
3 See, e.g., 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145 (2d 
ed. 1987); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality:  A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral 
Rights of Authors, 1, 26–29 (1988); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of 
Author Autonomy:  A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 359–61, 374–77 (1993). 
3 
treated as extensions of the author’s person.4  As such, certain types of interference with those 
works would be tantamount to intruding on a part of the author’s body. 
 The most common legal embodiment of personhood theory in copyright law are so-called 
moral rights widely recognized in continental Europe and incorporated into the 1928 revision to 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.5  Although the details 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in general moral rights give authors control over “whether, 
when, in what manner, by whom, and in what manner her work is presented to the public.”6   
 The result is a strong vision of copyright that gives initial authors near absolute control 
over many aspects of copyright protection, including derivative works, to the exclusion of 
audiences and follow-on authors.7  In many cases, personhood interests are so strong as to render 
moral rights inalienable.8  In addition, the traditional approach to personhood theory values 
creative works only as static artifacts.  The role of creativity in developing personality is limited 
to how the works are treated after they have been created and accords no role to the process of 
how works are created. 
                                                 
4 For an early statement, see Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right:  A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) (“When an artist creates, he does more than bring into the 
world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of his personality and 
subjects it to the ravages of public use.”). 
5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 
221. 
6 Netanel, supra note 3, at 350.  Although the term “moral rights” follows the French term droit moral, the 
concept is more accurate captured by the German term Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht, which means author’s rights of 
personality.  Id. at 383 n.162; accord Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. 
J. COMPARATIVE L. 67, 92 (2007) (using the shorter form, Persönlichkeitsrecht).  
7 See, e.g., Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue:  The Cultural Consequences of 
Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 169 (1994) (“[M]odern commentators have for the most part used 
Hegel to defend near-absolute copyright protections, including derivative rights.”). 
8 See Rigamonti, supra note 6, at 98 (tracing inalienability to the influence of 1 OTTO VON GIERKE, 
DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 756 (1895)).  For a review of the inalienability of moral rights, see Neil Netanel, 
Alienability Restrictions and the Enforcement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Europe 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 48–77 (1994). 
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 I believe that the conventional wisdom takes far too narrow a perspective on the 
relationship between copyright and personhood.  By focusing exclusively on how creative works 
are treated after they have been created, the conventional wisdom ignores a broader range of 
ways, first suggested by the aesthetic writings of Kant and Friedrich Schiller, that creativity can 
develop personality.  Since then, a vibrant literature in psychology, aesthetics, and philosophy 
has arisen that explores how the heuristic process of creating works can play a key role in self-
actualization.  A more encompassing conception of the relationship between personhood and 
creativity would regard creative works as more than mere repositories of personality and would 
examine how the process of creation itself can develop personality. 
 Reconceptualizing personhood-based theories of copyright in this manner provides a 
number of important insights.  As an initial matter, the broader approach provides a personality-
based justification for taking into account the interests of follow-on authors in using the creative 
process to develop their own personalities.  To the extent that creativity necessarily builds on and 
extends the preexisting corpus of creative works, such a theory would provide an affirmative 
basis for insisting that follow-on authors have sufficient access to the existing corpus of prior 
works. 
 If this were all that were necessary, personhood theory would yield only a right of access 
for personal uses that omitted any right to share any derivative works created in this manner with 
anyone else.  To the extent, however, that creativity must have an audience in order to be truly 
self-actualizing, this new approach would provide a basis for a right to disseminate works 
created in this manner notwithstanding the fact that they borrow from prior works.   
 The broader approach to personality also offers a possible response to one of the 
criticisms of existing copyright scholarship, which is the failure to provide a clear, affirmative 
5 
theory of the public domain.9  Indeed, even public domain advocates concede that the public 
domain remains defined largely in negative terms10 and recognize the need for better articulation 
of affirmative theories of the public domain.11  The revised personhood-based justification for 
copyright offers a basis for identifying a core of creative material that must remain in the public 
domain if individuals are to develop their sense of self. 
 Any theory providing an affirmative justification for copyright necessarily carries with it 
implicit limits.  The reconceptualized personhood-based theory of copyright is no exception.  As 
an initial matter, the scholarship on which it is based strongly contends that in order to be self-
actualizing, creativity must exist as an end unto itself and not be instrumentally motivated to 
realize other objectives.  This commitment strongly militates against extending the right of 
access and dissemination to works that are commercial in nature.  It supports broader rights of 
access for educational purposes and more limited rights for nonchildren. 
                                                 
9 Most trenchantly, Edwards Samuels asks whether “the public domain [is] simply whatever is left over the 
after various tests of legal protection have been applied?” or whether the public domain is animated by “some 
compelling public policy or legal principle, that gives it a life of its own, that would tend to attribute positive aspects 
to it,” only to conclude “that there is no such animal:  the public domain is simply whatever remains after all 
methods of protection are taken into account.”  Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 137, 137–38 (1993); accord id. at 149 (concluding, after reviewing the proffered 
affirmative justifications for the public domain, that “it would appear that there simply is no such general theory”); 
see also Edward Samuels, The Public Domain Revisited, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 391 (2002) (reaffirming 
Samuels’s belief that “what I said in 1993 is essentially still correct”); Vincenzo Vinciguerra, Contributing to the 
Understanding of the Public Domain, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 453 (2006) (noting that “the 
sum of the very different approaches and theories contribute to an image of the public domain as an ‘empty box,’ 
capable of every form and meaning, and thus, with no defined form altogether”). 
10 See James Boyle, Foreword:  The Opposite of Property, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter/Spring 2003, at 
1, 30 (“The term ‘public domain’ is generally used to refer to material that is unprotected by intellectual property 
rights . . ..”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968, 976 (1990) (describing the public 
domain as “a commons that includes those aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect” and “the 
realm comprising aspects of copyrighted works that copyright does not protect”);  Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and 
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217 (2002) (“Often the public domain is defined in 
terms of what it is not.”). 
11 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the 
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361–62 (1999) (“The particular weakness of the traditional definition of the 
public domain is that it evokes an intuition about the baseline, while not in fact completely describing it.”); James 
Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 2007, at 5, 8 n.11 (recognizing 
that “we do need a better theory of the public domain,” while acknowledging that the result may be multiple, 
overlapping theories). 
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 Moreover, the fact that the interests of follow-on authors must be balanced against the 
interests of initial authors dictates that any right of dissemination must be restricted only to the 
amount necessary for authors to develop their personalities.  To conclude otherwise would avoid 
the problem of privileging the interests of initial authors over all others only to fall into the 
opposite trap of focusing exclusive attention on the interests of follow-on authors. 
 The result is a reconceptualization of personhood-theory of copyright that is more 
consistent with the philosophical foundations on which personhood theory is traditionally based 
and that takes into account a broader range of mechanisms through which creative works can 
promote self-actualization.  It supports an affirmative basis for recognizing a right of access (and 
perhaps dissemination) by follow-on authors, while simultaneously balancing them against the 
interests of initial authors. 
 The Chapter is organized as follows:  Part I examines the aesthetic tradition exploring the 
role that creativity serves in developing a person’s faculties and personality, taking as its starting 
point the seminal work of Kant and Schiller exploring the role that play (spiel) plays in creating 
personality.  Although Kant and Schiller offered a passive vision of play, in which audiences 
simply contemplate great works of art, later psychologists, aestheticians, and philosophers 
articulated a more active vision in which individuals actively engage in the creative process.12  It 
culminates in a theory that recognizes that individual self-actualization may depend on people 
                                                 
12 Other scholars have explored how play can shape personality.  Julie Cohen views play as the result of 
interactions between the “networked self” and the cultural and architectural context in which is situated.  JULIE E. 
COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF:  LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 3–5, 32–33, 
50–57, 82, 225–29 (2012).  Madhavi Sunder sees play as an important part of a participatory culture.  MADHAVI 
SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 71–73 (2012) and shared 
meaningThis Chapter views play as an intrinsic motivation that emanates entirely from the individual and is not 
shaped by extrinsic considerations.  Examining play through the lens of the philosophy, psychology, and aesthetics 
also provides normative content to the concept of play, which addresses one of the central limitations of Cohen’s 
work.  See Niva Elkin-Koren, Affordances of Freedom:  Theorizing the Rights of Users in the Digital Era, 6 
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 96, 103-04 (2012). 
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becoming authors themselves.  Drawing on the work recognizing that creativity often builds on 
prior works, this theory suggests that individual self-development may require a degree of access 
to the preexisting corpus of creative works.  It then explores whether, in addition to being 
created, creative works must be read or shared with a community in order to play a role in 
developing one’s sense of personality, which would in turn support a right of dissemination. 
 Part II explores the insights this reconceptualization yields for a personhood-based theory 
of copyright, discussing how it recognizes a broader range of ways that creativity develops 
personality, takes into account the interests of follow-on authors, and provides an affirmative 
theory of the public domain.  It also examines the limitations implicit in the theory, discussing its 
emphasis on noncommercial and educational activity and providing for limits to any associated 
rights of dissemination. 
I. TOWARD A BROADER CONCEPTION OF PERSONHOOD AND CREATIVE WORKS 
 In focusing narrowly on the extent to which a finished work of art embodies its creator’s 
personality, the conventional wisdom applying personhood theory to copyright ignores the other 
ways that creative works can contribute to given person’s sense of self.  Most importantly, 
creative works are important not just as artifacts that are extensions of the will of their creators.  
Examining German aesthetic theory rather than property theory makes clear that the heuristic 
experience of engaging with creative works can also promote personality.  This insight is 
perhaps best embodied in the German aesthetic concept of play (spiel), which, in the classic 
German dualist tradition, serves to unify the conflict between a person’s rational and sensual 
8 
impulses.13  Although Kant’s and Schiller’s vision of play involved passive contemplation of 
creative works, later psychologists, aesthetic scholars, and philosophers explored how creating 
works can play an essential role in promoting self-actualization. 
 Recognizing the importance of engaging in creative activity does not by itself determine 
the proper scope of copyright protection.  Indeed, if creativity were the sole product of the 
author’s imagination, each person could simply pursue their own self-actualization without 
needing any extrinsic resources.  To the extent that creative works are adaptations from the 
extant corpus of creative works, personhood theories arguably support structural copyright law to 
give individuals sufficient access to prior works to achieve self-actualization.  Moreover, to the 
extent that such works must be read by others or be shared with a community in order to be 
meaningful, this theory arguably supports a right of dissemination. 
A. Creativity and Self-Actualization through Play 
 The fonts of modern theories of how creativity can develop personality are the work of 
Kant and Schiller.14  Although many developmental psychologists focus on the consequentialist 
aspects of play,15 such as a release of excess energy,16 a safety value for discharging pent-up 
emotions,17 or the practice of behaviors that will become useful later in life,18 the German 
                                                 
13 For an early work that hinted at this idea without developing it, see David Lange, At Play in the Fields of 
the Word:  Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Most-Literate Millennium, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spr. 1992, at 139. 
14 MIHAI SPARIOSU, DIONYSUS REBORN: PLAY AND THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION IN MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE (1989). 
15 For a survey, see Dorothy W. Jackson & Henry R. Angelino, Play as Learning, 13 THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE: VALUE OF PLAY FOR LEARNING 317, 318–20 (1974). 
16 Herbert Spencer. 
17 See Konrad Lange, Illusion in Play and Art, in A MODERN BOOK OF ESTHETICS 5 (Melvin Rader ed., 3d ed. 
1960). 
18 See KARL GROOS, THE PLAY OF MEN (1908). 
9 
tradition values play for its ability to allow each person to develop her own sense of self rather 
than for its ability to promote other more consequentialist values. 
1. Kant 
 The seminal modern statement of how creative works can contribute to human self-
actualization appears in the first part of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment in a section 
entitled the “Analytic of the Beautiful.”19  According to Kant, humans experience the “feeling of 
life,” described as the pleasurable experience of being endowed with and exercising a freedom 
that transcends the world and everything in it, only when they are in a “state of free play” 
completely free from any restraining concepts.20  Human beings engage in free play when they 
make “judgments of beauty.”21  Beauty is not an inherent characteristic of an object, such as a 
statement about its shape or its color, which may not evoke any feelings of pleasure at all.  
Instead, judgments of beauty necessarily represent a person’s visceral reactions to the object.22 
 In addition, judgments of beauty are distinct from statements of preference, which reflect 
the speaker’s appetites and interests.  Although such statements also refer to subjective 
experiences of pleasure produced by objects, the desire to consume or appropriate an object 
reflects what Kant calls an “interest” in the object.  Having an interest in an object makes a 
person dependent on it.23  This need draws the person along in a way that makes that person not 
completely free.  It is only when a person’s “wants” have been “appeased” that such a statement 
                                                 
19 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (J.H. Bernard trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1951) (1790).  The 
discussion that follows draws on Anthony Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. L. REV. 311, 318–26 
(1999). 
20 KANT, supra note 19, at 52. 
21 Id. at 42. 
22 Id. at 56. 
23 Id. at 43. 
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constitutes a true judgment of beauty.24 
 Judgments of beauty are also distinct from judgments of moral duty, such as the classic 
Kantian categorical imperative.  Kant writes, “Where the moral law speaks, there is no longer, 
objectively, a free choice as regards what is to be done.”25  Only judgments that are exercised 
independently of reason and desires produce the pleasure associated with judgments of beauty.  
Indeed, judgments of beauty are inherently not rule-bound, since there is no rule about what is 
beautiful and what is not.  Thus Kant concludes that art is “genuine only if it is autonomous.”26 
 Instead, judgments of beauty reflect an “entirely disinterested satisfaction” that is a 
feeling of wholeness and integrity that is fully gratified merely by observing the object.27  It is 
only when people are unconstrained by wants or rules that their cognitive faculties are in a state 
of free play,28 which Kant describes as “purposiveness without purpose.”29  Indeed, conceived in 
this manner, aesthetic pleasure is the pleasure of freedom itself.   
 Although judgments of beauty are inherently subjective, the fact that they are 
disinterested and independent of individual preferences creates the potential for those judgments 
to be shared by others as well.  Kant regarded judgments of beauty as invitations to others to 
recognize this same pleasurable power in themselves.30  Indeed, every judgment of beauty 
contains an aspiration toward universality that is missing from mere statements of preference or 
personal taste, carrying with it the expectation that others can and ought to share that judgment.31  
Sharing a judgment of beauty that has the potential to be universally communicable with others 
                                                 
24 Id. at 44. 
25 Id. at 45. 
26 Id. at 62. 
27 Id. at 45. 
28 Id. at 52. 
29 Id. at 62, 68. 
30 Kronman, supra note 19, at 326. 
31 KANT, supra note 19, at 59. 
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who possess the same ability to experience this freedom for themselves creates a shared 
experience that goes beyond two people reaching the same conclusion after conducting the same 
scientific experiment.  The anticipated pleasure of being in the company of one’s equals an in 
communication with them gives rise to the pleasure that Kant calls “sociability.”32 
2. Schiller 
 Kant’s work prompted a response from Schiller.  Best known as the second-leading 
figure of German literature (behind only Goethe), Schiller has long been overlooked as an 
aesthetic theorist.  His early work directly challenged Kant’s subjective vision of aesthetic taste, 
laying out a theory of art “based on principles.”33  Schiller defined beauty as the result of 
harmony between opposing forces:  the physical and the moral, duty and inclination.  He 
described this harmony as the Schöne seele (“beautiful soul”), which is the human product of the 
synthesis or harmony of opposing drives reconciled through a process of aesthetic education.34 
 In his Aesthetic Letters, Schiller focuses explicitly on the concept of play as the means for 
reconciling these conflicting drives.  In explaining his theory of aesthetics as the path to freedom, 
Schiller discusses the primary elements of human experience as “impulses” (triebe).35  The form 
impulse (formtrieb) reflects the tendency of the mind toward rational explanations and structure, 
while the material or sensual impulse (stofftrieb) looks to concrete facts for its explanations of 
the world around it.36 
 The play impulse (spieltrieb) is the aesthetic drive that brings these opposing drives 
                                                 
32 Id. at 139. 
33 FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN IN A SERIES OF LETTERS, letter 26 (Reginald 
Snell trans., 1954) (1793). 
34 Id. letter 12. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
12 
together and holds them in tension.37  The ultimate form of play, he states, is in contemplating 
the beautiful, the process described above through which the viewer can temporarily engage both 
drives at once, allowing moral and physical constraints to cancel each other out in a way that sets 
the psyche free.38  Thus, for Schiller, the ability to play is representative of freedom.  Indeed, 
“man . . .  is only fully a human being when he plays.”39  Rather than degrading beauty to a mere 
frivolity, the term “play” is intended to connote liberation.   
 Together, Kant and Schiller emphasized the importance of the idea of play in the human 
experience.  Under this conception, play is undertaken for its own sake, which stands in stark 
contrast to the consequentalist visions of play that view it as an outlet for excess or compensation 
for deficient energy, practice for adult life, a mechanism for the assimilation of information, or 
some other instrumental purpose.40  Instead, play develops the sense of self directly and is valued 
for itself. 
B. Toward a More Active Vision of Creativity through Play 
 What is particularly striking about Kant’s and Schiller’s views is the passiveness of their 
vision of play.  Under this conception, play involved the appreciation of great works of art that 
could only be created by great masters.  This so-called Romantic vision of authorship does not 
recognize any value to individuals’ efforts to author creative works on their own, a position 
criticized for its attempt to justify privileging the positions of authors.41 
                                                 
37 Id. letter 15. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
41 Indeed, a leading scholar has attributed this in large part to Schiller’s desire for financial self-sufficiency 
and his frustration at Germany’s failure to enact meaningful copyright protection.  See MARTHA WOODMANSEE, 
AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET:  REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 59 (1994) (discussing Schiller’s desire 
to promote his own self-sufficiency by promoting German adoption of copyright law); Anne Barron, Kant, 
13 
 Later theorists would develop more active visions of play.  Most important for our 
purposes are the psychologists, aesthetic theorists, and philosophers who have explored the deep 
connections between creating expressive works and the development of personality. 
1. Psychology:  Maslow, Rogers, and Self-Determination Theory 
 Psychology provides perhaps the strongest foundation for the important role that 
individual authorship of creative works can play in the development of personality.  One 
prominent example is Abraham Maslow’s celebrated study on the hierarchy of needs, which 
posited that humans are motivated by the drive to satisfy five basic needs.42  Only after the more 
fundamental needs are satisfied can individuals seek to satisfy needs located higher in the 
hierarchy.43  At the top of the hierarchy is the need for self-actualization, which “is not 
necessarily a creative urge although in people who have any capacities for creation it will take 
this form.”44   
 Maslow early work speaks of creative expression as if it were the unique province of 
artistic people,45 suggesting that artists find the drive to create so strong that it is never 
satisfied.46  His later work breaks form this limited vision of creativity, emphasizing that self-
actualizing creativity was not limited to the artistic class by drawing a distinction between 
                                                 
Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 LAW & PHIL. 1, 26 (2012) (noting that “Kant’s major concern in the 
1785 Essay is in fact to legitimize the book trade . . . and the profits that may be realized from it”). 
42 Specifically, these needs are physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization.  Abraham Maslow, 
A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCH. REV. 370 (1943).  He developed it further in ABRAHAM MASLOW, 
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 80–92 (1954). 
43 Maslow, supra note 42, at 394. 
44 Id. at 383. 
45 Maslow, supra note 42, at 382 (“A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he 
is to be ultimately happy.  What a man can be, he must be.  This need we may call self-actualization.”). 
46 Id. at 386 (“There are other, apparently innately creative people in whom the drive to creativeness seems to 
be more important than any other counter-determinant.  Their creativeness might appear not as self-actualization 
released by basic satisfaction, but in spite of lack of basic satisfaction.”). 
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“special-talent creativeness” and “self-actualizing creativeness.”47  Broadening the conception of 
creativity permits Maslow to recast creativity as “a fundamental characteristic, inherent in human 
nature, a potentiality given to all or most human beings at birth.”48  Under this revised vision,  
cooks, hostesses, homemakers, social service workers, and clinical psychiatrists can all be 
creative in their own way and noted that “a first-rate soup is more creative than a second-rate 
painting, and that, generally, cooking or parenthood or making a home could be creative while 
poetry need not be.”49  He “learned to apply the word ‘creative’ . . . not only to products but also 
to people in a characterologicial way, and to activities, processes, and attitudes.”50  Indeed, self-
actualizing creativeness “stresses first the personality rather than its achievements, considering 
these achievements to be epiphenomena emitted by the personality and therefore secondary to 
it.”51  Creative people “are all integrators, able to bring separates and even opposites together 
into unity.”52  The “inner integration of the person” is what permits creativeness to be 
“constructive, synthesizing, unifying, and integrative.”53  Indeed, “the creativity of [Maslow’s] 
subjects seemed to be an epiphenomenon of their greater wholeness and integration.”54  
 Maslow finds creativity “hard to define because it is seems to be synonymous with health 
itself” and “almost synonymous with, or a sine qua non aspect of, or a defining characteristic of, 
                                                 
47 A.H. Maslow, Creativity in Self-Actualizing People, in CREATIVITY AND ITS CULTIVATION 83, 85 (Harold 
H. Anderson ed., 1959), reprinted in ABRAHAM MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 135, 137 (2d ed. 
1968); and ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 158, 160 (3d ed. 1987). 
48 Id. a 137. 
49 Id. at 136. 
50 Id. at 137. 
51 Id. at 145. 
52 Id. at 140. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.at 141; see also id.at 144 (arguing for increased emphasis “on the role of integration (or self-consistency, 
unity, wholeness) in the theory of creativeness”).. 
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essential humanness.55  Although his later work adopts a similar tone,56 it implies a more causal 
relationship between creativity and self-actualization, suggesting that creative expression should 
be part of any educational curriculum “not so much for turning out artists or art products, as for 
turning out better people,” because the creative process plays a key role allowing people to 
“become full human beings” and to “move toward actualizing the potentialities that they have.”57  
Maslow further describes how during “the inspirational phase of creative furore,” the creative 
person “loses his past and his future” and becomes “utterly lost in the present.”58  When people 
create, they are “then most integrated, unified, all of a piece, one-pointed, totally organized in the 
service of the matter-at-hand.”59  “Creativeness is therefore systemic; i.e., a whole—or Gestalt—
quality of the whole person”60 that allows “the fusion of the person and his world.”61  It is at 
these moments when people are “most fully realizing themselves, most mature and evolved, 
most healthy, when, in a word, they are most fully human.”62  
 Carl Rogers similarly regards creativity as a reflection of “man’s tendency to actualize 
himself, to become his potentialities.”63  “It is this tendency which is the primary motivation for 
creativity as the organism forms new relationships to the environment in its endeavor more fully 
to be itself.”64  The motivation is intrinsic, not extrinsic.  Although creativity may be socially 
                                                 
55 See id. at 145. 
56 Abraham H. Maslow, The Creative Attitude, 3 THE STRUCTURIST 4, 4 (1963) (“My feeling is that the 
concept of creativeness and the concept of a fully-human person seem to be coming closer and closer together, and 
may perhaps turn out to be the same thing.”). 
57 Id. at 4. 
58 Id. at 6. 
59 Id. at 9.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 10. 
62 Id. at 6; see also A.H. Maslow, Emotional Blocks to Creativity, 14 J. INDIV. PSYCH. 51 (1958) (describing 
how creativity allows the fusion of people’s primary processes, which are unconscious and unbounded) and their 
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63 Carl R. Rogers, Toward a Theory of Creativity, 11 ETC.:  REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 249, 251 (1954). 
64 Id. at 252. 
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beneficial, “the individual creates primarily because it is satisfying to him, because this behavior 
is felt to be self-actualizing.”65  Creativity is not the unique province of great works, applying 
equally to “creating new formings of one’s personality in psychotherapy” as to “painting a 
picture, composing a symphony, devising new instruments of killing, developing a scientific 
theory, [or] discovering new procedures in human relationships.”66  In short, creativity is a 
capacity that exists in every individual. 
 Rogers expands on these thoughts in his later work.  Like Maslow’s self-actualized 
person, Rogers views his ideal “fully functioning person” as a creative person “from whom 
creative products and creative living emerge.”67  In a later book chapter based on this article, he 
concludes that “a person who is involved in the directional process which I have termed ‘the 
good life’ is a creative person.”68  Rogers in turn defines the good life as “the process of 
movement in a direction which the human organism selects when it is inwardly free to move in 
any direction, and the general qualities of this selected direction appears to have a certain 
universality.”69 
 These themes have found modern expression in the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
developed by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan70 and extended to copyright by Terry Fisher.71  
SDT represents a modern version of theories that regard human behavior as motivated by the 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 250. 
67 Carl R. Rogers, The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person, 1 PSYCHOTHERAPY:  THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 
17, 23 (1963), reprinted in CARL R. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON:  A THERAPIST’S VIEW OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
183, 193 (1961).  Maslow recognized the connection as well.  A.H. Maslow, A Holistic Approach to Creativity, in 
CLIMATE FOR CREATIVITY:  REPORT OF THE SEVENTH NATIONAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON CREATIVITY 287, 288 
(Calvin W. Taylor ed., 1971). 
68 ROGERS, supra note 67, at 193.   
69 Id. at 187. 
70 See Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and the “Why” of Goal Pursuits:  Human Needs and 
Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCH. INQ. 227 (2000).   
71 William W. Fisher III, The Implication for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1465 (2010). 
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need to satisfy innate psychological needs rather than serving instrumental goals.72  In particular, 
SDT posits that humans are motivated by the need to fulfill three psychological needs:  
competence, relatedness, and autonomy.73   
 In focusing exclusively on psychological needs, SDT excludes behaviors motivated by 
physiological needs.74  In addition, SDT focuses on intrinsically motivated activities, defined as 
“those that individuals find interesting and would do in the absence of operationally separable 
consequences,”75 such as “[a] man who, in the evening, sits at the keyboard and begins to play a 
piece of music, may become lost in its beauty and experience great pleasure.”76  Deci and Ryan 
note that “intrinsic motivation is associated with better learning, performance, and well-being.”77  
Promoting intrinsic motivation in turn encourages creativity,78 whereas introduction of external 
motivations reduces both the sense of self determination and creativity.79  Interestingly, Deci and 
Ryan argue that individuals can internalize extrinsic motivations in ways that are consistent with 
need satisfaction so that they in turn become part of their own intrinsic motivation.80 
*  *  * 
 Together these psychologists view creativity as an innate attribute of fully self-actualized 
individuals.  These people pursue creativity as an end unto itself.  Those engaging in self-
actualizing creativity become lost in the moment.  Indeed, any extrinsic motivation destroys the 
                                                 
72 Deci & Ryan, supra note 70, at 227, 231. 
73 Id. at 228,  
r74 Id. at 229. 
75 Id. at 233. 
76 Id. at 230. 
77 Id. at 233. 
78 Id. at 258. 
79 Id. at 234. 
80 Id. at 235–39. 
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self-actualizing quality of creativity.  The focus is neither on the consequences of the art nor on 
the tangible output, but rather on how the process of creation itself develops the sense of self.81 
2. Aesthetics and Education 
 Aesthetic theorists have similarly emphasized the role that creativity can play in 
developing each individual’s sense of self.   Aesthetician Eugene Kaelin writes that “[t]he 
ultimate value of aesthetic expressions” lay in “the discovery of my own personality:  of those 
feelings (some of which are forced upon me by my environment) which correlate most clearly 
with my true self.  The self, then, must be such as to be developed by expression.”82  R.G. 
Collingwood similarly notes that “an artist creates in order to get his feelings clear,” which in 
turn induces clarity to her psychic conditions.83 
 The key role that creating works can play in personal development has led many scholars 
to argue that art should represent a fundamental component of every child’s education.84  Some 
believe artistic expression allows people to explore who they are and what makes them unique.85  
Others echo Schiller by arguing that creating art permits individuals to achieve unity of body and 
mind.86  Still others contend that the release of emotion and ideas through creativity permits 
individuals to become more fully integrated and developed as human beings.87  This school of 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., EDWARD L. MATTIL, THE SELF IN ART EDUCATION 1 (1972) (National Art Education Association 
Research Monograph #5) (citing Maslow and Rogers as the basis for theories connecting creativity and personality); 
Willet W. Ryder, The Role of Art in Self-Actualization, ART EDUC., Mar. 1987, at 22, 22, 24 (same). 
82 EUGENE F. KAELIN, ART AND EXISTENCE:  A PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETIC 90 (1970). 
83 R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE PRINCIPLES OF ART (1958). 
84 For an overview, see Ryder, supra note 81, at 22, 23–24. 
85 See MATTIL, supra note 81, at 12–13; Frances K. Heussenstamm, Humanizing Higher Education, ART 
EDUC., Mar. 1971, at 17, 18. 
86 See Kenneth R. Beittel, The Teaching of Art in Relation to Body-Mind Integration and Self-Actualization in 
Art, ART EDUC., Nov. 1979, at 18. 
87 See Florence Cane, Art in the Life of the Child, in CREATIVE EXPRESSION (Gertrude Hartman & Ann 
Shumarer eds., 1926). 
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thought emphasizes that the process of creation matters more than the product,88 which has 
become a theme echoed by modern scholars.89 
3. Capabilities Theory:  Sen and Nussbaum 
 Other copyright scholars see a justification for personhood-theory in the “capabilities 
theory” pioneered by economist Amartya Sen90 and extended by philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum.91  This approach places upon the state the obligation to provide every individual with 
the preconditions they need to flourish and to develop their faculties meaningfully.92   
 Although some scholars suggest that human dignity only applies to needs lower in 
Maslow’s hierarchy and does not include copyright,93 Nussbaum’s catalog of the key aspects of 
the human condition includes “Senses, Imagination, and Thought,” which encompasses being 
able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and 
events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth.”94  In her other writings, 
Nussbaum also includes play, defined as “[b]eing able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities,” as one of the ten basic capabilities.95  Development of such capabilities is valued for 
its own sake and not for some consequentialist or extrinsic benefits.  Legal scholars have built on 
                                                 
88 See Viktor Lowenfeld, Creative and Mental Growth (rev. ed. 1952). 
89 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 25, 27, 79 (2008). 
90 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 288 (1999). 
91 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78 
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93 Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 45 (1989). 
94 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 76–78. 
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the capabilities theory to argue that copyright should be shaped to ensure that people have the 
means to be creative.96 
*  *  * 
 Although these theories are diverse, they share the common perspective that personal 
involvement in originating creative works plays a critical role in developing a sense of self.  In 
the process, it replaces the passive role envisioned by Kant and Schiller with a broader 
conception that appreciates that personality is determined as much by the process of creating 
works as well as how the results of those creative processes are treated.  Moreover, they suggest 
that the law would be best served by providing the conditions necessary to allow individuals to 
engage in such self-actualizing behavior. 
C. The Cumulative Nature of Creativity 
 What would the obligation to enable individuals to develop their sense of self by 
engaging in creative activity entail?  Courts and scholars have long recognized how creative 
works typically borrow from and extend the existing corpus of works.  For example, Justice 
Story once noted: 
Virgil borrowed much from Homer, Bacon drew from earlier as well as 
contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning of his profession; 
and even Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly our boast as the brightest 
originals would be found to have gathered much from the abundant stores of 
current knowledge and classical studies in their days.97 
                                                 
96 See COHEN, supra note 12, at 21; SUNDER, supra note 12, at 7–8, 89Fisher, supra note 71, at 1466–76. 
97 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.). 
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Ralph Waldo Emerson similarly noted that “the debt is immense to past thought.  None escapes 
it.  The originals are not original.  There is imitation, model, and suggestion, to the very 
archangels, if we knew their history.”98   
 Copyright scholars have frequently noted the extent to which works borrow from prior 
works when making arguments to limit protection for derivative works.99  In particular, a 
literature has developed critiquing the influence of the Romantic vision of authorship, which 
regards creativity as springing fully formed from the author’s head.100   
 A classic example of this line of scholarship is Jessica Litman’s article on The Public 
Domain, which observed that “[a]ll works of authorship, even the most creative, include some 
elements adapted from raw material that the author first encountered in someone else’s works” 
and that “the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination 
than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.”101  She notes that such observations in 
previous scholarship were almost invariably offered in passing without any analysis.  Indeed, 
Jessica Litman has called the insight “such a truism that it has long been a cliché, invoked but 
not examined.”102  She proffers a more detailed description of the mechanism through which 
authors draw on other works subconsciously.103  Authors create works without distinguishing 
                                                 
98 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Quotation and Originality, in 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
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whether the inspiration resulted from new ideas, past experiences, or works they have read.104  
Instead, works are the result of their entire range of experiences filtered through a “combination 
of absorption, astigmatism, and amnesia.”105  Rather than being mere “parasitism,” borrowing is 
“the essence of authorship.”106  It also provides a justification for ensuring that current authors 
have sufficient access to the preexisting corpus of works.107  Although a literature has emerged 
challenging how much Romantic authorship has actually influenced U.S. copyright law,108 these 
studies have not challenged the inherent cumulative nature of most (if not all) creative works. 
 Although Litman does not invoke the literature directly, Litman’s theory finds intellectual 
support from post-structural critical theory, which responded to New Criticism’s privileging of 
the work as a source of meaning by emphasizing the intertextual nature of all writings.  For 
example, Northrop Frye admonished, “Poetry can only be made out of other poems; novels out 
of other novels.”109  Frye rejected the view that “imagines that a ‘creative’ poet sits down with a 
pencil and some blank paper and eventually produces a new poem in a special act of creation ex 
nihilo,” noting that “[h]uman beings do not create in that way.”110  He critiqued the Romantic 
tendency “to think of the individual as ideally prior to his society.”111  Instead, all works are 
“born into an already existing order of words.”112  Each work of creativity can only be 
understood as part of a larger genre and the conventions surrounding that genre.113 
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 Roland Barthes echoed the same themes when he argued that “a text does not consist of a 
line of words, releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God).”114  
Instead, “the text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture . . . . 
[The writer’s] only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as 
never to rest on any of them.”115  Harold Bloom similarly noted, “The more deeply and widely 
we read, the more we become aware that good poems, novels, and essays are webs of allusion, 
sometimes consciously and voluntarily so, but perhaps to a greater degree without design.”116  
Julia Kristeva similarly notes that “any text is a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption 
and transformation of another.”117 
 Like Litman, literary theorists regard the process by which current works build on the 
preexisting literary corpus as being unconscious.118  Borrowing moves from the subconscious to 
the conscious in Lawrence Lessig’s most recent book, Remix.  Through a series of anecdotes, 
Lessig celebrates what he calls Read/Write (RW) culture, in which people do not just consume 
culture; they add to it “by creating and re-creating the culture around them.”119  In contrast, to the 
previous Read Only (RO) culture, in which “[a]rtists want their expression framed just as they 
intend it,” RW culture “asks something more of the audience” in that “[i]t invites a response.”120  
                                                 
114 Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE—MUSIC—TEXT 142, 146 (Stephen Heath trans. 1977) 
(1967). 
115 Id. 
116 Harold Bloom in Plagiarism—A Symposium, N.Y. TIMES LITERARY SUPP., Apr. 9, 1982, at 413. 
117 Julia Kristeva, Word, Dialogue, and Novel, in DESIRE AND LANGUAGE 64, 66 (Leon S. Roudiez ed., 
Thomas Gora et al. trans., 1980).  The preexisting corpus of works was not the only extrinsic source of interpretation 
under post-structural theory.  The other contextual source was the values and perspective brought by the reader.  See 
infra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. 
118 See Abigail Derecho, Archontic Literature: A Definition, a History, and Several Theories of Fan Fiction, in 
FAN FICTION AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: NEW ESSAYS 61, 75 (Karen Hellekson & 
Kristina Busse eds., 2006). 
119 LESSIG, supra note 89, at 28. 
120 Id. at 84, 85. 
24 
The more participatory culture surrounding RW culture creates a greater level of responsibility121 
and permits children to develop a higher degree of cultural literacy,122 which Lessig equates to 
democratic literacy.123  It has the added virtues of allowing kids to create their works within the 
context of a community and providing them with engaging subject matter to use as the building 
blocks for learning.124 
 Lessig further argues that “[r]emix is an essential act of RW creativity” and advocates 
preserving a right to quote or remix as a “critical expression of creative freedom” that should be 
preserved.125  Although the Internet and digital technologies have opened remix expression to the 
masses,126 they have simultaneously given creators of the original works a greater ability to 
prevent would-be remixers form obtaining access to their works.127  Although Lessig sees value 
in professional creativity,128 he warns that the enhanced level of control culture threatens to stifle 
the benefits of participation and responsibility associated with amateur creativity.129  To correct 
this balance, Lessig advocates adopting a hybrid approach that permits commercial and sharing 
cultures to coexist.130  While he speaks in terms of balance, his policy recommendations131 and 
the concluding pages of his book132 indicate that his primary concern is ensuring that would-be 
remixers enjoy sufficient access to the raw material they need to create their works. 
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 Fan fiction represents another prominent example of conscious borrowing from the 
existing corpus of works.  Indeed, the intertextuality of fan fiction is not merely implicit.  
Instead, works of fan fiction consciously quote from a defined archive of works while 
simultaneously contributing back to it, claiming a specific relationship with that corpus and 
“pointedly locating themselves within the world.”133  Far from being protected by property 
interests, the world of fan fiction “allows, or even invites, writers to enter it, select specific items 
they find useful, make new artifacts using those found objects, and deposit the newly made work 
back into the source text’s archive.”134  Indeed, the fact that an entire community is accessing the 
same preexisting corpus provides the common bond that holds the community of fan fiction 
writers together.135 
*  *  * 
 Together these theories provide a basis for arguing that individual self-actualization 
depends on having sufficient access to the preexisting corpus of works.  Some argue that the 
cumulative nature of creativity may be an inevitable aspect of the human condition.  Others 
contend that even if borrowing from prior works is not inevitable, it provides certain benefits that 
are worth promoting as a matter of policy.  When combined with the arguments discussed in 
Parts A and B connecting creativity with the development of personality, both suggest that 
preventing follow-on authors from obtaining sufficient access to prior works can harm the 
development of individual personality.  Support for this position does not depend on the extreme 
                                                 
133 See Derecho, supra note 118, at 65; Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit:  Copyright Law and Subcultural 
Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 135, 143. 
134 Derecho, supra note 118, at 65. 
135 Letter from Rebecca Tushnet, Org. of Transformative Works, to U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong. 7 
(Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/organization-transformative-works-
34.pdf. 
26 
claim that no true works of independent creation exist.  So long as derivative creativity remains 
an important source of self-actualization, the presence of examples of truly original inspiration 
would simply recalibrate the proper balance rather than eliminate all need for access to prior 
works.  
D. The Need for an Audience 
 The cumulative nature of all creativity provides one insight into ways that a richer 
conception of the relationship between personhood and creativity can shape copyright doctrine.  
If authoring creative works is both essential to self-actualization and requires access to the 
preexisting corpus of works, one might construct a theory of copyright that limits initial authors’ 
ability to prevent follow-on authors from creating derivative works.   
 Such an argument would not necessarily lead to the broad type of access to preexisting 
works that advocates imagine.  Some self-sufficient authors create for themselves and do not 
care if their work ever finds an audience.  Indeed, if the act of creation itself is what develops 
personality, the need for self-actualization would be completely satisfied by a personal use right 
that did not include any right of dissemination.  If anything, the emphasis that the psychological 
and aesthetic theories discussed above place on disinterestedness, intrinsic motivation, and living 
in the moment militate against such a right to disseminate. 
 That said, the idea that people will find fulfillment from authoring works that will never 
be read seems strange.  Indeed, scholars as early as Aristotle recognized that “the poets merely 
follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate.”136  One branch of literary theory suggests that 
authors inevitably internalize their expectations of their readers’ likely responses into their work.   
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1. Internalizing the Audience’s Expected Reaction 
 Anyone who has written or spoken in public appreciates how the nature of the audience 
can affect the content of the speech.  Studies of the importance of an audience are best developed 
by the field of literary theory.  Understanding this literature requires an appreciation of the 
overarching arc of scholarship in the field.  Much of modern literary theory is a reaction to the 
New Criticism school that arose in the 1920s and 1930s, which focused on the close reading of 
texts as formal objects, independent of historical context.137  A subsequent school known as 
Structuralism was similarly formal, but instead of focusing on words, it focused on the larger 
structures of signification that gave different words different meanings.138  These schools shared 
a formal orientation and a desire to make interpretation more objective and scientific. 
 Structuralism in turn gave way to the cluster of schools that fit under the collective 
banner of Poststructuralism, with Barthes serving as a key transitional figure.  While different 
flavors of Poststructuralism vary, they are based on the recognition that the structure that gives 
words meaning is a socially determined, cultural concept that can only be understood by 
analyzing the context in which words are used.139  This accords audiences an important role in 
determining the meaning of texts.140  Many theorists argue that meaning is the joint product of 
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authors and readers.141  More extreme versions of Poststructuralism give almost total primacy to 
audiences.142 
 By focusing on the social meaning of speech, approaches that regard the interpretation of 
texts as the joint product of authors and audiences (or even the exclusive province of audiences) 
are directed externally rather than the more inward-focused concerns of self-development.  This 
interactive conception of play is what animates the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in which the 
game plays the individual as much as the individual plays the game.143  This conception of 
creativity as the joint product of authors and the contexts in which they operate is what animates 
Julie Cohen’s exploration of interaction between play and creativity.144   
 There is a different vision of the need for an audience that is exclusively intrinsically 
motivated and not the joint product of both authors and audiences.  One branch of reader-
response theory recognizes how authors may anticipate and incorporate how readers are likely to 
receive their work.  For example, Gerald Prince discusses the role of “narratees,” the persons to 
whom authors are addressing their work.145  Indeed, Prince envisions the narratee as a character 
(sometimes present only implicitly)146 who exists internal to the text, rather than a reader who is 
outside the text.147   
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 Similarly, Wolfgang Iser discusses how authors write for an “implied reader.”148  Unlike 
intended readers, which reflect the author’s aims, and hypothetical informed readers, whose 
qualities are socially determined, Iser’s implied reader has predispositions entirely laid down by 
the text itself “independent of any outside reality.”149  In contrast to the insight that “literary texts 
take on their reality by being read,” the implied reader is “a textual structure anticipating the 
presence of a recipient without necessarily defining him” that “prestructures the role to be 
assumed by each recipient.”150  Quite aside from any actual reader, the implied reader is a “role 
offered by the text” that provides a “a frame of reference within which individual responses to a 
text can be communicated to others,” thereby “provid[ing] a link between all the historical and 
individual actualizations of the text and mak[ing] them accessible to analysis.”151  From this 
perspective, even gaps that remain for readers to fill are part of the strategy of the author and 
thus under his control.152   
 Prince’s and Iser’s vision of the role of audiences is more consistent with the internal 
impact (rather than the external social meaning) that is the focus of personhood-theory than is 
traditional reader-response theory.  In essence, these audiences’ roles in interpreting texts are 
internalized by the author and reified in the text.  The environment does influence authors, but in 
a non-recursive manner that authors internalize into their intrinsic motivations when authoring 
the work.  Deci and Ryan noted, moreover, recursive processes often cause such external 
considerations to be internalized.153   
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 This vision, however, begs an important question:  is it enough for authors to internalize 
the role of the expected audience, or must the work actually be read in order for authorship to be 
self-actualizing?  Prince’s and Iser’s focus on the external question of the interpretation of texts 
lead them not to offer an answer. 
 One possibility is that authors may be so self-directed and may have so completely 
internalized extrinsic motivations that they write for themselves and may not care if their work 
ever finds a real-world audience.  If so, personhood theory would not imply any right of 
dissemination.  Another possibility is suggested by game theory, which has long recognized the 
anticipation of the consequences of choices can cause equilibria to unravel.154  Authors whose 
works are never read will find that the process of anticipating their audience’s reaction was an 
entirely hypothetical exercise.  If they only realize this after the fact, they will have already 
gained the benefits with respect to self-actualization.  More discerning authors who understand 
the overarching structure may be able to anticipate that the law will prevent them from sharing 
their works with others.  This realization may demotivate certain authors, which in turn may 
prevent them from realizing the self-actualizing benefits of authorship. 
2. Valuing Community 
 Another justification for the right to dissemination is implicit in the importance of 
community associated with remix and fan fiction cultures.  Although saying that new works tend 
to build on prior works can justify a right of access to existing corpus, to the extent that the 
process is internal to the author, it does not imply any right to share those works.  Consider the 
remix culture, which Lessig embraces because of the manner in which it promotes responsibility, 
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cultural literacy, and the democratization of content creation.155  These values could arguably be 
satisfied by a personal use right that authorizes access to prior works for private purposes but 
forbids any publication of those works. 
 Lessig’s argument invokes a second conceptual premise to support a right of 
dissemination:  the value of creating content in a community in which members create for one 
another and help each other learn how create.156  His success model is the anime subculture of 
Japan, in which children begin by making and sharing their own sketches with others and then 
are introduced to the larger subculture by an older child.157  The result is that creators see 
themselves as participants in a self-supporting community.158  Indeed, “the pleasures of 
production of transformative works are intrinsic to participating in a creative community rather 
than motivated by extrinsic financial rewards.”159 
 Community plays an even more central role for fan fiction, whose participants define 
themselves by a shared interest in a common body of work.160  Many discussions of fan fiction 
emphasize the distribution of authorship and the centrality of a community of interpreters, who 
are also authors.161  Other members of the community provide feedback that helps new authors 
improve, with the shared desire for additional commentary on the common source material 
serving as the glue that holds the community together.162  Engagement with this larger 
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community is particularly important for younger authors, who learn from engaging with other 
members.163  While many creators regard creating fan fiction “as an end in itself, and may only 
share their videos with a few close friends,” many create in order to obtain recognition and status 
that can only achieved through approbation by a community characterized by an elaborate 
subculture that is quite hierarchical and stratified and governed by a core group of elites.164 
 The presence of community makes the dynamics surrounding fan fiction somewhat 
complex.  Although peer production is often lauded for its democratic qualities and accessibility 
to everyone,165 like all social practices, every community of peer production is embedded in a 
structure with its own sets of rules.  In the case of fan fiction, the ability to participate in a larger 
community in which transformative works can be shared and can receive feedback plays a 
central role in constituting the subculture.  This reasoning does not lead to a rule of access in all 
contests.  Indeed, it only applies to subcultures in which the cycle of publication and feedback is 
central to the subculture.  Moreover, the fan fiction community insists that any such sharing be 
noncommercial.166  Subject to these limitations, the example of fan fiction does support a limited 
right of dissemination. 
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERSONHOOD-BASED THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT 
 Reconceptualizing personhood-based theories in the manner I propose would place them 
on a sounder conceptual footing.  Not only does it accord better with the philosophical writings 
on which personhood theory purports to be based. As discussed in Section A below, it recognizes 
that creativity can affect personality in more ways than just how the outputs of the process are 
treated after they have been created.  It accommodates the interests of follow-on authors in a way 
that the conventional wisdom cannot.  And it provides an affirmative basis for mandating access 
to the existing body of creative works.   
 While my theory does support those normative implications, at the same time, its logic 
suggests a number of important limitations, which I will discuss in Section B.  Specifically, it 
suggests that any right of access be limited to noncommercial works, educational purposes, and 
only as much dissemination as necessary to serve the values of community. 
A. Insights 
 Adopting a broader sense of the ways that creative works can promote personhood yields 
a number of important insights.  These insights in turn have important implications for copyright 
law.   
1. Creativity as a Process, Not an Artifact 
 The traditional view of personality theory takes a very narrow conception of the 
relationship between creative expression and personality that focuses exclusively on how works 
are treated after they have been created.  In essence, this approach treats works as static artifacts 
that are mere repositories of their creators’ personalities. 
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 The revised conception adopts a broader view that recognizes that the process of creating 
works can also play an important role in developing personality.  In so doing, it embodies a more 
heuristic view of creativity that focuses less on the results and more on the creative process itself. 
2. Greater Importance to Follow-On Authors 
 Another shortcoming of the conventional wisdom regarding personhood theory is that it 
places almost exclusive importance on the interests of the initial author.  Indeed, the interest of 
the initial author is often regarded as being so strong as to convey absolute, inalienable control 
over derivative works.167 
 Kant’s and Hegel’s reluctance to recognize strong interests in derivative works 
acknowledges that derivative works reflect the personalities of follow-on authors as much as 
initial authors.  Indeed, the process-oriented perspective on personhood reflected in the 
psychological, aesthetic, and philosophical literature shifts the focus away from creative works 
as static artifacts and instead reconceives of them as essential contributors to a dynamic process 
of self-actualization.168 
3. An Affirmative Theory of the Public Domain 
 The final and most important advantage of my proposed reconceptualization of 
personality theory is its potential to provide an affirmative theory of the public domain, the 
absence of which both proponents and opponents of the trend toward broader copyright 
protection have widely regarded a weakness.169  As noted above, the public domain has often 
been defined as the residuum left after property rights have been defined.  To the extent that 
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property justifications are economically focused, the scope of fair use naturally contracts as 
technological advances reduce transaction costs.170 
 The broader conception I propose supports reforming copyright in ways that reflect the 
full range of ways that creative works can promote self-actualization.  By recognizing how 
creating works both can develop personality and requires access to preexisting works, my 
approach to personality theory provides a justification for providing follow-on authors with 
access to the extant corpus of creativity.171  To the extent that those works must be shared with 
others in order to be meaningful, it also supports a right of dissemination. 
B. Limits 
 At the same time any theory implies certain types of reform, it also necessarily suggests 
the natural limits of those reforms.  These limits come in part from the internal logic of the 
theory and in part from factors external to the theory that cut in the opposite direction.  The 
presence of these internal limits and countervailing considerations offer natural reference points 
for determining the proper scope of any reforms taken in the name of my revised vision of 
personhood theory. 
1. Intrinsicness and Noncommerciality 
 One major limit is the extent to which any personhood-based rights of access and 
dissemination must be noncommercial.  Commerciality has long presented a puzzle for copyright 
law.  Some early cases regarded that the fact that a work is commercial uses presumptively fall 
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outside of fair use.172  Later cases clarified that the fact that a work is commercial in nature does 
not by itself disqualify derivative works from falling within fair use.173 
 The internal logic of how creating works can develop personality suggests limiting the 
right of access to noncommercial uses.  Kant’s initial exposition of how creative works can 
develop personality emphasized that the experience must be disinterested from personal wants 
and needs.174  Psychological theory emphasizes that individuals can only pursue self-
actualization after their more instrumental needs have been satisfied and that such self-
actualization can only occur when people live in the moment, creating for its only sake without 
any focus on the implications for the future.175 
 Lessig similarly focuses on the differences between commercial and gift cultures, 
emphasizing the differences in values176 and observing that “price is poisonous” to reciprocal 
noncommercial cultures.177  While Lessig would not limit access rights to noncommercial 
uses,178 only noncommercial uses would be free, with those making commercial remixes having 
to pay a compulsory license fee.179  Indeed, Lessig’s recognition of the benefits associated with 
commercial creativity necessary entails some type of balance.180 
 The rationale for allowing authors to share works created from other works also militates 
against including commercial works within its scope.  As noted earlier, the fan fiction 
community has adopted a strong norm against commercial uses as inconsistent with the 
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reciprocity of exchange.181  Indeed, many regard commercial compensation as inconsistent with 
the reciprocal values that undergird the fan fiction community.182 
 The internal logic of this vision of personhood suggests limiting any access and 
dissemination rights to noncommercial uses, as the need for self-actualization would be satisfied 
by the noncommercial uses.  Although some suggest that the distinction between these 
commercial and noncommercial uses may prove slippery,183 personhood justifications do not 
support a broader set of reforms. 
2. The Emphasis on Education 
 Another limitation implicit in some portions of the theory is an emphasis on youth-
oriented education.  For example, education plays a key role in Lessig’s lauding the fact that 
remix allows children to learn through materials they find particularly interesting, noting that 
“[w]hen kids get to do work that they feel passionate about, kids (and, for that matter, adults) 
learn more and learn more effectively.184  This sharing helps develop cultural literacy and serves 
as a form of apprenticeship in which they actually learn more.185  Although Lessig does offer a 
nod toward adult learning, his rationale applies with special force to the education of children. 
 Rebecca Tushnet similarly emphasizes education when enumerating the benefits of fan 
fiction.  Fan fiction creates “a unique opportunity for learning, personal expression, and 
individual autonomy.”186  Participation also enhances health so “that we should encourage these 
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kinds of social institutions for youth.”187  Adapting preexisting stories also helps children 
develop cultural literacy.188 
 To the extent that these rationales emphasize youth-oriented education, they impose 
natural limits on the scope of any reforms implied by the theory.  They would provide less 
support for extending rights of access and dissemination to noneducational contexts. 
3. Implicit Limits to the Rights of Access and Dissemination 
 Lastly, saying that personhood theory implies a right of dissemination is not to say that 
such a right should be unlimited.  On the contrary, the presence of countervailing considerations 
(such as the benefits of commercial authorship recognized by Lessig) suggests that any such 
rights be limited to the amount necessary to support self-actualization. 
 For example, any right to create derivative works must be balanced against protecting the 
rights of the initial authors.  For example, in recognizing that follow-on authors may make a 
sufficient contribution to justify trumping the interests of initial authors, both Kant and Hegel 
implicitly recognized that initial authors have personality interests that are not overcome until the 
interests of follow-on authors become sufficiently important.189  Any other conclusion would 
sidestep the problems of giving exclusive primacy to the interests of initial authors only by 
falling into the opposite trap of giving exclusive primacy to the interests of follow-on authors. 
 The same could be said for any personhood-based right of dissemination.  Recognizing 
that content must be shared with a community to be meaningful does not necessarily entail an 
unlimited right to disseminate.  On the contrary, any such right would naturally be limited to the 
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amount and the community needed for authorship to be meaningful.  For example, while the role 
of the narratee and implied reader recognized by literary theory may require that the derivative 
work be read by someone in order to promote self-development, it does not necessarily require 
that the work be available to the broadest possible audience.  Instead, the presence of competing 
interests dictates that the dissemination right would be limited to the smallest possible number of 
readers needed to allow the creative process to be self-actualizing.  Similarly, any need to share 
creative works with a community would logically be limited to that community.  It would not 
entail a right to disseminate works more broadly. 
 These inherent limits underscore the value of any good theory.  Any arguments used to 
justify a position necessarily only go so far.  The scope of the reasoning thus inevitably includes 
its own limitations.  Proper application of personhood theory thus requires a clear understanding 
of why certain reforms are justified and a readiness to cease advocating for further reform after 
those rationales have been exhausted. 
CONCLUSION 
 Personhood theory occupies a central place in copyright theory.  Enshrined in the 
institution of moral rights, personhood theory is widely regarded as giving initial authors 
absolute, inalienable control over many aspects of their works. 
 In this Chapter, I have argued that the conventional wisdom about personhood and 
copyright justifications suffers from some fundamental problems.  Focusing on the connection 
between the author and the work adopts too narrow a vision of the ways that creative expression 
contributes to personality.  It fails to recognize how the process of creation can play a role that 
can be as important as how works are treated once they have been created.  In so doing, the 
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conventional wisdom adopts a view that focuses exclusively on initial authors without taking the 
interests of follow-on authors into account. 
 My reconceptualization of personhood theory accords better with the theory’s purported 
philosophical roots.  It adopts a broader conception of personhood that takes into account a 
broader range of ways that creativity can foster personal development.  It takes the interests of 
follow-on authors seriously by embracing how creativity often builds on the corpus of prior 
works.  In so doing, it offers an affirmative theory of why copyright law should provide access to 
existing works.  The importance of readers and the need for authorship within a community 
arguably supports a right of dissemination. 
 Like any theory, the revised conception of personhood theory carries with it limits as well 
as justifications.  It suggests that any such rights be limited to noncommercial and educational 
uses.  Moreover, rights of access and dissemination should be limited to the amount necessary 
for follow-on authors to develop their personalities. As with any initial attempt to rethink an area 
of law, many of the ideas presented here are somewhat exploratory and will no doubt be refined, 
extended, and criticized in the future.  I certainly expect that this will be the first rather than the 
last word in a long debate. 
